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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently reformed overseas anti-corruption laws are changing the
landscape of international business, particularly in the booming emerging
market economies. Investors in countries such as Brazil and India now
consider corruption prevention strategies an increasingly important com-
ponent in their investment plans. New legislation and renewed
prosecutorial zeal come just as private equity increasingly looks abroad for
lucrative investment opportunities.1 In the United Kingdom (U.K.), The
United Kingdom Bribery Act of 2010 (U.K. Bribery Law) creates a strict
liability corporate offense, holding corporate management responsible for
corrupt practices by employees, subsidiaries, and joint venture partners
anywhere in the world.2 Notably, jurisdiction extends not only to British
companies, but also to any entity carrying on “a part or all of a business”
in the U.K.3 Meanwhile, in the United States (U.S.), the Obama adminis-
* Isaac Binkovitz is a New York-based Associate at Allen & Overy LLP. He
graduated magna cum laude from University of Michigan Law School in 2013. While in law
school he served as Articles Editor for MJPVL. He received a B.A. first-class honours with
distinction from McGill University in 2009.
1. Steven M. Davidoff, Private Equity Looks Abroad, but May Be Blind to the Risks,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 21, 2010, 6:03 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/
private-equity-looks-abroad-but-may-be-blind-to-the-risks/ (explaining the risks facing pri-
vate equity firms as they turn abroad, including deficiencies in rule of law).
2. U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010 GUIDANCE 16-17 (2011)
[hereinafter BRIBERY ACT 2010 GUIDANCE], available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/
downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf  (describing the meaning of “associated
parties” under the Act).
3. Id. at 15 (describing the extent of jurisdiction over foreign entities conducting a
part of their business in the U.K.: “As regards bodies incorporated, or partnerships formed,
75
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tration has increased anti-corruption enforcement efforts under the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).4 The combination of these two
developments make investments and acquisitions in developing econo-
mies, where corruption is most widespread, a veritable minefield–if it were
not already.5
Which activities are prohibited? Who can be held liable? How is pri-
vate equity responding to avoid getting caught in the crosshairs? The fol-
lowing discussion provides a preliminary guide for those tasked with
steering private equity firms through the shifting obstacle course of over-
seas anti-corruption compliance. Section I briefly reviews the centrality of
overseas anti-corruption enforcement and its role in creating a more hos-
pitable business climate in emerging markets. Section I also examines the
American and British enforcement regimes in general before analyzing
the most recent changes–specifically, changes as to the scope of liability
and expansion of their jurisdiction. This section is designed to help deter-
mine whether investments or acquisitions fall within the purview of either
enforcement regime. Section II discusses various strategies that may be
implemented to prevent overseas corruption and minimize liability under
the U.K. Bribery Law’s “adequate procedures” provision.6 Given how re-
cently and significantly the enforcement efforts have changed, Section III
identifies some areas of remaining ambiguity.
II. BACKGROUND
Thirty-nine nations are signatories to the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention.7 This
Convention represents a growing global consensus to reduce the preva-
outside the United Kingdom, whether such bodies can properly be regarded as carrying on a
business or part of a business ‘in any part of the United Kingdom’ will again be answered by
applying a common sense approach.”).
4. Richard Blackden, The New Head of the SEC Has to be More than a Tough Cop,
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 8, 2013, 6:45 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/9856560/
The-new-head-of-the-SEC-has-to-be-more-than-a-tough-cop.html (“SEC . . . has already
stepped up its investigations under the FCPA, with prosecutions more than tripling to 80 over
the past six years.”).
5. For one such example, in the case of East Asia, see Ashley Lee, The Cost of Com-
pliance: Due Diligence Issues in Asia M&A Deals, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (Mar. 4, 2013), http://
www.iflr.com/Article/3163469/Corporate/The-cost-of-compliance-due-diligence-issues-in-
Asia-M-A-deals.html (describing diligence and compliance costs for foreign investors in East
Asia, including risks under the FCPA).
6. The adequate procedures provision provides a defense from the strict liability cor-
porate offense where companies have undertaken reasonable efforts to prevent bribery.
7. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD],
OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF 20 NOVEMBER 2012 (2012),
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/antibriberyconventionratification.pdf (list-
ing those state parties that have signed and ratified the Convention).
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lence of bribery in international business.8 In 2009, the OECD issued gui-
dance via the OECD Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Recom-
mendation).9 The Recommendation urges greater vigilance in enforce-
ment of existing anti-corruption laws, and calls for the enactment of more
stringent provisions to curtail bribery. This international soft law has in-
spired many countries to develop domestic hard law measures aimed at
combatting global corruption.10 Pursuant to the Recommendation, a
growing number of countries have enacted such hard law measures and
have pursued prosecutions under these newly enacted laws.11
The U.S., Germany, and Italy are among the nations with the highest
total number of sanctions imposed for violations of bribery laws.12 In re-
cent years, the U.K. has imposed far fewer sanctions than the U.S.13 How-
ever, this is expected to change rapidly, as the U.K. has ramped up its
enforcement efforts over the past year.14 The U.K. Bribery Law has joined
the American FCPA as a global leader in anti-bribery legislation.15 With
two of the largest financial and commercial hubs in the world economy
stepping up enforcement, it is important to know which entities must fol-
8. For the English text of the Convention, see OECD, CONVENTION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 6
(2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf (re-
quiring contracting states to undertake the enactment of legal reforms to prevent interna-
tional bribery of foreign public officials in business transactions).
9. For the English text of the Recommendation, see id. at 20.
10. See generally K.W. Abbot, Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of
Bribery & Corruption, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 275 (2001) (contrasting the success of OECD soft
law on corruption in facilitating the creation of domestic hard law with the relative failure of
the WTO to achieve comparable success in the area of corruption law).
11. See Romit Guha, India Plans Changes in Anti-Corruption Law, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
10, 2012, 9:45 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044479990457804831250
8806652.html; Ilya Kharlamov, Putin Seeks Tough Anti-Corruption Law, VOICE OF RUSS.
(Feb. 12, 2013, 7:16 PM), http://voiceofrussia.com/2013_02_12/Putin-seeks-tough-anti-corrup-
tion-law/; Colin Simpson, Federal Anti-Corruption Law in UAE Expected in Six Months, NA-
TIONAL (Jan. 20, 2013), http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/federal-anti-corruption-
law-in-uae-expected-in-six-months; Thomas Firestone, New Russian Law Goes beyond
FCPA, Bribery Act, FCPA BLOG (Mar. 5, 2013, 8:02 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/
2013/3/5/new-russia-law-goes-beyond-fcpa-bribery-act.html.
12. OECD WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY, 2010 DATA ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE
ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 4 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/39/
47637707.pdf.
13. Id.
14. See John Bray, UK Anti-Corruption Efforts are Getting Serious, FORBES (Sept. 9,
2013, 10:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2013/09/19/uk-anti-corruption-efforts-
are-getting-serious/.
15. Press Release, OECD, UK Increases Enforcement of Foreign Bribery, but Con-
cerns Remain About Transparency and Resources (Mar. 30, 2012), available at http://www.
oecd.org/newsroom/ukincreasesenforcementofforeignbriberybutconcernsremainabouttrans
parencyandresources.htm.
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low these two statutes, what behaviors are prohibited, what penalties may
be imposed, and how to reduce bribery-related liability.
A. The Problem of Corruption
Corruption and bribery affect not only major political decisions or the
actions of the largest corporations, but also millions of private-sector com-
mercial transactions (such as contract bids and permit applications). Such
behavior is socially wasteful for a variety of reasons. First, the value paid
in the bribe is value not allocated to some more productive use.16 Second,
the benefit conferred upon the bribing party may incentivize socially
counterproductive behavior or crime.17 For example, a less qualified con-
tractor or a contractor who has entered a less competitive bid ought not
win a contract by virtue of a bribe alone.18 Bribery may cause the job to be
completed poorly or at too high a cost, directly and detrimentally affecting
the public. Third, bribery undermines the legitimacy of the government in
the eyes of its citizens and others who interact with it.19 This could reduce
public willingness to cooperate with officials for other useful purposes.
And, finally, corruption leaves the bribing party unable to enforce the bar-
gain after the fact.20 For example, a land registry official could take a bribe
to grant title to a specific plot of land. However, when an adverse claimant
offers a competing, larger bribe, the official is in a position to renege on
the original bargain or raise the price for a counterbid bribe. Thus, bribery
does not represent a one-time cost, but the ongoing problem of uncer-
tainty, which can stifle business planning and increase financing costs.
Where cost projections are perceived to be inaccurate, imprecise, or unsta-
ble due to corruption, lenders will charge an additional risk premium to
finance the project. Thus, even for those projects that remain free from
corruption-related cost increases, financing remains more costly, due to
the prospective risk of corruption from the outset.
16. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 275 (1999) (explaining how corrup-
tion distorts efficient market development).
17. Id. (explaining how corruption not only diverts funds from useful pursuits, but
actually fuels the development of criminal organization and a culture of entrenched corrup-
tion in other spheres).
18. See id. at 276-77 (explaining that bribery cannot be controlled simply by the provi-
sion of material incentives, but that it also requires the development of normative codes of
conduct rooted in solidly founded cultural understanding of what is right). “Ought not” is
deliberately used in both the reductively economic sense and the normative ethical sense.
19. Id. (explaining the entrenchment of bad governance in contexts with pervasive
bribery, as well as the incentive a bribery culture produces for the development of an overly-
regulatory rent-retracting state).
20. ALEXANDRA WRAGE, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION: UNDERMINING BUSINESS, GOV-
ERNMENTS, & SECURITY 69-70 (2007) (discussing the unenforceability of the reciprocal bene-
fit to be received in exchange for a bribe).
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Somewhat paradoxically, such inefficient behavior is most common in
some of the most rapidly growing economies in the world.21 Public percep-
tion of public sector corruption is a good indicator of the prevalence of the
problem in a given country. Booming markets like Brazil, Russia, India,
and China (the so-called BRIC countries) have some of the highest cor-
ruption perception indices in the world.22 Improved market efficiency and
better governance stemming from reduced corruption could further bol-
ster the already intense pace of economic growth in these nations. The
global economy as a whole could experience a strong buoying effect from
such a surge.
Conversely, other countries that are high on the corruption perceptions
list are some of the poorest nations on the planet.23 Though improving
market-based allocation of resources and capital in these countries may
not be as meaningful to the world economy as a whole, such improve-
ments present a strong humanitarian interest. Indeed, to the extent that
corruption can be curtailed in places like Somalia, Myanmar, and Afghani-
stan–three of the nations with the highest corruption perception indi-
ces–poorly performing economies may well improve.24 While it is doubtful
that anti-corruption reform alone would be sufficient to significantly im-
prove economic conditions in these least-developed nations, it is surely an
important factor, and one that is very likely to boost nations like Brazil,
Argentina, Russia, and India into the club of more highly developed mar-
ket economies.
Corruption is a serious source of inefficiencies in both advanced and
emerging economies.25 The diversion of funds in the form of bribes (both
to public officials and to private commercial actors) for an unfair (read:
unwarranted by the law or market forces) advantage inhibits accurate cost
projections, raises the cost of doing business, frustrates the efficient ad-
ministration of governmental regulation, and inhibits market-based alloca-
tion of capital and resources to their highest value uses.26 In some
countries, corruption represents a significant drain on the national econ-
omy, crippling the rule of law, limiting government accountability, and
hindering economic development.27
21. Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://cpi.transparency.
org/cpi2012/results/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (indicating that China, Russia, India, and





25. See generally INST. FOR INT’L ECON., CORRUPTION & THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997) (describing the high global costs of corruption).
26. See JONG-SUNG YOU, CORRUPTION AS INJUSTICE 20-25 (2007), available at http://
irps.ucsd.edu/assets/001/503060.pdf.
27. Id.; see also SEN, supra note 16, at 275-78.
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Countries such as India struggle to curb the pernicious effects of wide-
spread corruption and bribery in both the private and public sectors. Last
year, the Indian parliament failed to muster the political will to enact a
significant piece of anti-corruption legislation.28 Even where local will is
found and translated into legislation, it remains highly questionable how
effectively such measures will be enforced without any means of insulating
the prosecutor and judiciary from the very same culture of corruption.29
Given the clear difficulties of local enforcement for the time being, it
falls to well-established democracies to provide a mechanism to regulate
global corruption to the extent they are able to extend jurisdiction, as in
the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery Law. An external means of corruption
regulation could help undermine the local entrenchment of corruption in
certain contexts where bribery is common. This is not simply the rallying
cry of development activists. Businesses have also sought ways to reduce
the prevalence of corruption, which acts as a significant drain on invest-
ments and creates an element of uncertainty.30 Whether the efforts of
these democracies are rooted in humanitarian altruism, a moral abhor-
rence of the impropriety of profiting from such practices, or the desire to
create better business climates for global firms seeking to operate or invest
in booming emerging markets, there has been a recent rise in efforts to
curb corrupt practices perpetrated abroad, to the benefit of companies and
investors based in countries like the U.S. and U.K.
Traditionally, the U.S. has been the most active in this field.31 In recent
years, the Obama administration has overseen a significant uptick in De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) FCPA enforcement.32 The U.K., too, has joined in the increased
anti-corruption vigilance, enacting the U.K. Bribery Law, which came into
force July 1, 2011.33 With these changes, the British law is now the most
extensive, both in the range of practices prohibited and geographic scope.
28. Ronak D. Desai, How Will India Confront its Corruption Crisis?, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 25, 2013, 5:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ronak-d-desai/how-will-india-
confront-i_b_2756670.html (explaining that India’s parliament is still only “considering enact-
ment of a robust, but highly contentious piece of anti-corruption legislation known as the Jan
Lokpal Bill” more than a year after massive protests called for reform).
29. SEN, supra note 16, at 276 (addressing “the complex question of providing the right
incentives for the thief catchers (so that they are not bought off)”).
30. Steve Lodge, Ask the Expert: Risk Check for Emerging Markets, FIN. TIMES (Dec.
2, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9f15c122-fd60-11df-b83c-00144feab49a.html#axz
z1iidQoMeb.
31. U.S. Leads Anticorruption Efforts at the OECD, U.S. MISSION TO THE OECD
(Aug. 23, 2013), http://usoecd.usmission.gov/mission/combating-corruption.html (“For years,
the United States has led the fight against corruption”) (describing the American role in
pushing the OECD to follow its lead in anti-corruption efforts).
32. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, available at http://
www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last updated Jan. 9, 2013) (listing FCPA prose-
cutions by year).
33. See BRIBERY ACT 2010: JOINT PROSECUTION GUIDANCE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS c.23 (2010)
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However, both the U.K. Bribery Law and the FCPA seek to incentivize
compliance with similar bribery-preventive measures. Part III provides a
brief summary of the origins and provisions of the two acts, highlighting
some significant differences.
III. AMERICAN AND BRITISH REGIMES FOR COMBATING
OVERSEAS CORRUPTION
A. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The U.S. Congress first enacted the FCPA in 1977, creating what was
then the broadest global anti-corruption enforcement regime.34 Its juris-
dictional reach is broad, extending to bribes made anywhere in the world
by domestic businesses or foreign companies with a merely tangential rela-
tionship to the U.S., such as stock listings on a U.S. exchange.35 In recent
years, the DOJ and SEC have pursued an increasing number of prosecu-
tions under the FCPA.36 The largest settlement to date was with Siemens,
for $800 million in 2008.37 Bloomberg News reported at the time that the
$800 million sum came as a relief to investors, who had expected the DOJ
to announce an even larger settlement.38 To date, there have been eight
settlements of over $100 million.39
The FCPA establishes penalties for payments made to foreign public
officials or candidates for office for the purpose of influencing their deci-
sions or obtaining their business.40 Unlike its British counterpart, the
FCPA does not extend to payments made in the private commercial sector
(though caution is warranted given recent DOJ efforts to regulate such
payments under the Travel Act, discussed briefly in Part V). The FCPA
[hereinafter BRIBERY ACT 2010], available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/
pdfs/ukpga_20100023_en.pdf.
34. U.S. Leads Anticorruption Efforts at the OECD, supra note 31.
35. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOR-
EIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 11 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-
resource-guide.pdf.
36. SEC Enforcement Actions, supra note 32.
37. Sheenagh Matthews, Siemens Rises as Size of Bribery Fine Brings Relief, BLOOM-
BERG (Dec. 15, 2008, 4:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=a1VTUr9mfIH8; Erin Fuchs, The Largest Ever Corporate Payouts to the US over Foreign
Bribery Charges, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 14, 2012, 6:59 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-
largest-fcpa-settlements-2012-8?op=1.
38. Matthews, supra note 37.
39. Richard Cassin, J&J Joins New Top Ten, FCPA BLOG (Apr. 8, 2012, 3:43 PM)
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/4/8/jj-joins-new-top-ten.html (listing the top ten settle-
ments under the FCPA: Kellogg Brown & Root LLC settled for $579 million in 2009, BAE
for $400 million in 2010, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. and its parent company ENI S.p.A
for $365 million in 2010, Technip S.A. for $338 million in 2010, JGC Corporation for $218.8
million in 2011, Daimler AG for $185 million in 2011, and Alcatel-Lucent for $137 million in
2010). For a complete list of all FCPA prosecutions, see SEC Enforcement Actions, supra
note 32.
40. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012).
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offers a carve-out for routine payments.41 While this exception applies to
formal expediting fees and other processing charges, it also allows a
broader range of so-called facilitation payments that are barred under the
U.K. Bribery Law.42 Beyond this limited exception, the FCPA provides a
series of affirmative defenses. First, one may raise the defense of legality
under the local laws, a defense notably lacking from the U.K. Bribery
Law.43 Additionally, the FCPA exempts payments made as reimburse-
ment for bona fide expenses incurred in the performance of business on
behalf of one’s firm, such as travel.44 Permissible reimbursements also in-
clude a number of expenses incurred in promotional activities or in the
offering of samples.45 Such reimbursement payments are similarly allowed
under the U.K. Bribery Law.46
B. The U.K. Bribery Law
The U.K. Bribery Law provides criminal and civil penalties for those
who offer, pay, receive, or solicit favors or payments for an unfair advan-
tage.47 This prohibition on bribery goes beyond its American counterpart
to include payments made in the private sector, in addition to those made
to foreign public officials.48 Notably, the U.K. Bribery Law extends to fa-
cilitation payments and provides no defense in the form of legality under
local custom, law, or practice.49 The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) has indi-
cated that it will exercise discretion in determining whom to prosecute,
suggesting that it will hold larger and more sophisticated firms to a higher
standard.50
More remarkable even than the broad range of public and private sec-
tor payments prohibited under the U.K. Bribery Law is the breadth of its
jurisdiction and its strict liability corporate offense provision. The only re-
41. Id. § 78dd-1(b).
42. Facilitation Payments, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.sfo.gov.
uk/bribery—corruption/the-bribery-act/facilitation-payments.aspx (explaining prohibition on
facilitation payments under the Act).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1).
44. Id. § 78dd-1(c)(2).
45. Id. § 78dd-1(c)(2)(A).
46. See BRIBERY ACT 2010 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 12-14 (explaining that, though
not specifically exempted under the language of the Act, such reimbursements for bona fide
business expenses will not be prosecuted).
47. BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 33, § 11 (listing penalties).
48. See id. § 1 (defining the bribe-offering portion of the offense as prohibiting the
offer or payment of a bribe to another “person” generally, rather than to a “foreign public
official,” in contrast to the U.S. FCPA).
49. See id. § 14 (listing affirmative defenses); Facilitation Payments, supra note 42 (in-
dicating the lack of any carve out for facilitation payments).
50. See SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, BRIBERY ACT 2010: JOINT PROSECUTION GUIDANCE
9 (2012), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/167348/bribery_act_2010_joint_prosecu
tion_guidance_of_the_director_of_the_serious_fraud_office_and_the_director_of_public_pro
secutions.pdf (listing factors in decision to prosecute under the Act).
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quirement for jurisdiction is that the firm carry on all or a part of its busi-
ness within the U.K.51 Thus, under the strict liability corporate offense,
the SFO may prosecute any firm that does business in the U.K. for prohib-
ited payments made anywhere in the world, regardless of whether those
payments were made directly by the firm, its employees, third parties on
its behalf, contractors, associated joint ventures, or business partner-
ships.52 The Act also holds management to a strict liability standard under
the corporate offense.53 The firm may face unlimited fines and manage-
ment may face a jail term of up to ten years.54  While official published
guidance suggests that a company’s stock listing on the London exchanges
will not suffice as grounds for jurisdiction,55 foreign firms with even mini-
mal British operations should be careful not to consider themselves be-
yond the reach of the U.K. Bribery Law.
The U.K. Bribery Law has been called draconian by some and is
widely seen as the most far-reaching and severe of anti-corruption laws
globally.56 However, unlike the FCPA, the statute explicitly provides an
affirmative defense in the form of so-called adequate procedures. The es-
tablishment and implementation of adequate procedures to avoid corrup-
tion shields a firm and its management from criminal and civil liability.57
While the statutory language does not define what procedural safeguards
may suffice, the government has offered some general guidance on the
matter.58 The suggested procedures draw upon precautions similar to
those required by the U.S. SEC and DOJ in non-prosecution agreements
under the FCPA (see Part IV.A for more on the inclusion of mandatory
procedures in non-prosecution agreements, and see Part IV for more on
the specific steps that private equity firms can take to institute adequate
procedures.).
The Law avoids legislating specific standards, instead leaving the field
open for experimentation and good-faith industry efforts to create ade-
quate standards. For firms that fail to implement adequate procedures, the
U.K. Bribery Law offers to stay criminal prosecution in exchange for self-
reporting and cooperation with investigators.59 The message to interna-
tional business is clear: adopt formal procedures to prevent and report
corruption at all levels within the firm and among all related parties
51. See BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 33, § 7(5) (defining “relevant commercial or-
ganisation” for purposes of the corporate offense).
52. See BRIBERY ACT 2010 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 9.
53. See BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 33, § 7.
54. Id. § 11.
55. BRIBERY ACT 2010 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 15-16.
56. Kirstin Ridley, Companies Brace for Bribery Act Wake-up Call, REUTERS (Nov. 4,
2010, 12:23 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/11/04/uk-britain-bribery-idUKTRE6A32
U720101104.
57. BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 33, § 7(2).
58. See generally BRIBERY ACT 2010 GUIDANCE, supra note 2.
59. Id. at 8.
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around the globe. Otherwise, be prepared to face zealous prosecution. Ef-
fectively, this is a hard law mandate (itself inspired by international soft
law from the OECD) for industry leaders to generate further soft law stan-
dards on the prevention of bribery.
The U.K. Bribery Law consists of three separate classes of offenses: (1)
the general offenses under Sections 1 and 2, (2) bribery of foreign govern-
ment officials under Section 6, and (3) the corporate liability offense for
failure to prevent corruption under Section 7. The standard of liability dif-
fers depending on the particular offense. Prosecutions under Sections 1, 2,
and 6 require that the charged person have knowingly perpetrated the
criminal act.60 Under Section 7, business entities are held to a strict liabil-
ity standard, with the availability of an affirmative defense for having
taken reasonable steps to prevent employees, agents, partners, or affiliates
from engaging in the behavior prohibited in Sections 1, 2, and 6.61
Section 1 prohibits offering, giving, or promising a financial or other
advantage in exchange for the improper performance of a relevant func-
tion or activity.62 Section 2 correspondingly prohibits requesting, ac-
cepting, or agreeing to accept a financial or other advantage in exchange
for the improper performance of a relevant function or activity.63 Section
3 defines “relevant function or activity” as “any function of a public na-
ture; any activity connected with a business, trade or profession; any activ-
ity performed in the course of a person’s employment; or any activity
performed by or on behalf of a body of persons (whether corporate or
unincorporate).”64 Notably, this covers both private and public functions.
Section 4 characterizes the performance of a relevant act or activity as
“improper” where it constitutes a breach of an expectation of good faith
or impartiality or where it is performed in a way that a person in a position
of trust would not reasonably have anticipated.65
Section 6 prohibits the bribery of foreign public officials.66 Notably, it
does not cover the conduct of the foreign official receiving or requesting
the bribe. This is consistent with the one-sided obligations enshrined in the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.67 For political and practical reasons and
considerations of comity and deference, the Law leaves the monitoring of
60. See BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 33, §§ 1-2, 6.
61. Id. § 7. For more on the corporate commission of violations under Sections 1, 2,
and 6, see id. § 14. For violations of the Section 7 corporate offense through partners, see id.
§ 15.
62. Id. § 1.
63. Id. § 2.
64. Id. § 3.
65. BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 33, § 4.
66. Id. § 6.
67. OECD, Commentaries on the Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions (1997), pmbl., DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, avail-
able at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/combatbribe2.pdf (“This Convention
deals with what, in the law of some countries, is called “active corruption” or “active brib-
ery”, meaning the offence committed by the person who promises or gives the bribe, as con-
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the foreign official’s conduct to local law enforcement. In order to further
avoid scrutinizing the propriety of the conduct of foreign officials, Section
6 does not require a showing that the bribe recipient acted improperly,
unlike the offenses under Sections 1 and 2.68 In a similar vein, Section 13
excludes intelligence gathering and military contracting activities from the
Law’s purview.69 These defenses leave a broad swath of international
commercial activity unregulated under the Law.
The corporate liability offense under Section 7 has caused the greatest
stir in the business world. It is a strict liability offense, requiring no intent
to bribe or actual knowledge of the bribe.70 The entity is liable for viola-
tions of Sections 1, 2, and 6 committed by anyone in the company. Further,
Section 8 (“associated persons”) provides for vicarious liability under the
corporate offense, and Section 14 provides for liability through actions of
partners.71 Fortunately, Section 7(2) provides for the previously discussed
affirmative defense of adequate procedures to prevent bribery (both at the
receiving and paying ends).72 How precisely this affirmative defense is de-
fined is the most important question a company should consider in deter-
mining how to comply with the Law, one which has been the subject of
considerable speculation.
Unlike the FCPA, the U.K. Bribery Law does not provide for successor
liability. This has significant implications for mergers and acquisitions and
the private equity industry. An acquiring business entity will not be held
liable under the corporate liability offense for acts of bribery occurring in
or by the target company prior to the date of acquisition. This obviates the
need for retrospective due diligence. However, prudence dictates that the
acquiring company remain on guard against acquiring a business with an
established culture and practice of corruption (discussed at greater length
in Part IV). First, it may be difficult to alter an entrenched tolerance for
bribery, exposing the acquirer to prospective risks, such as continued brib-
ery. Second, performing due diligence in the acquisition is part of the risk
assessment encouraged under the adequate procedures affirmative de-
fense. Only by knowing what risks one has acquired can one purport to
undertake adequate procedures to mitigate those risks. Thus, extensive
due diligence, even regarding past conduct for which the acquirer is not
liable, should be conducted by a company that seeks to take shelter under
the affirmative defense.
Section 12 sets out the U.K. Bribery Law’s broad jurisdiction.73 In or-
der to fall under the provisions of the Law, conduct violating Sections 1, 2,
trasted with “passive bribery”, the offence committed by the official who receives the
bribe.”) (following the text of the Convention itself).
68. See BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 33, §§ 1-2, 6.
69. Id. § 13.
70. See id. § 7(1).
71. Id. §§ 8, 14.
72. Id. § 7(2).
73. Id. §§ 12(1)-(2).
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or 6 must have been committed either in the U.K. or abroad, provided that
such conduct would have been illegal had it occurred in the U.K., and the
prosecuted party must have a “close connection” to the U.K.74 This in-
cludes being a U.K. national or an entity organized in the U.K.75 Under
the corporate offense (Section 7), the standard is far looser, as no part of
the omission or underlying acts must have occurred in the U.K.76 Yet, the
Guidance indicates that Section 7 covers only those companies that are
“carry[ing] on a business or a part of a business in the U.K.”77 It is unclear
where precisely this line is drawn. The Ministry of Justice has indicated
that it does not intend to prosecute companies with mere stock listings or
subsidiaries in the U.K.78 However, entities with other activities in the
U.K. should be aware that they may fall within the Law’s purview, subject
only to prosecutorial discretion. Furthermore, the Guidance’s use of vague
language, so as to not rule out a broad range of prosecutions in the future,
provides minimal comfort to foreign businesses.
Section 10 provides that one found guilty of the individual offenses
may be prosecuted on either a summary offense charge or a criminal in-
dictment. Where charged with a summary offense, the perpetrator faces
up to 12 months in prison and unlimited fines.79 Where prosecuted under
an indictment, the maximum prison term is ten years, and the fines remain
unlimited.80 Section 14 provides that company directors may be held per-
sonally liable for violations of the corporate offense.81
74. See BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 33, §§ 12(1)-(2).
75. See id. § 12(4).
76. Id. §§ 12(5)-(6).
77. BRIBERY ACT 2010 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 15 (“A ‘relevant commercial or-
ganisation’ is defined at section 7(5) as a body or partnership incorporated or formed in the
U.K. irrespective of where it carries on a business, or an incorporated body or partnership
which carries on a business or part of a business in the U.K. irrespective of the place of
incorporation or formation. The key concept here is that of an organisation which ‘carries on
a business’. The courts will be the final arbiter as to whether an organisation ‘carries on a
business’ in the U.K. taking into account the particular facts in individual cases.”).
78. Id. at 15-16 (“However, the Government anticipates that applying a common sense
approach would mean that organisations that do not have a demonstrable business presence
in the United Kingdom would not be caught. The Government would not expect, for exam-
ple, the mere fact that a company’s securities have been admitted to the U.K. Listing Author-
ity’s Official List and therefore admitted to trading on the London Stock Exchange, in itself,
to qualify that company as carrying on a business or part of a business in the U.K. and
therefore falling within the definition of a ‘relevant commercial organisation’ for the pur-
poses of section 7. Likewise, having a U.K. subsidiary will not, in itself, mean that a parent
company is carrying on a business in the U.K., since a subsidiary may act independently of its
parent or other group companies.”).
79. BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 33, § 11.
80. Id.
81. Id. § 14. It is important to note that company directors may be exempted from
certain penalties under the Company Directors Disqualification Act of 1986.
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C. Private Equity Facing New Perils in Emerging Markets
Private equity firms increasingly seek investment opportunities over-
seas in emerging markets.82 While firms in emerging economies, such as
Brazil, China, and India, are desirable portfolio companies for private eq-
uity funds, they pose complex challenges for those accustomed to operat-
ing in developed economies.83 The 2010 U.K. Bribery Law, along with the
renewed vigor of enforcement in the U.S., adds to the risks that the private
equity industry faces in unfamiliar business climates, especially areas
where corruption is prevalent. To make matters worse for those unac-
quainted with the array of anti-corruption practices, both the U.S. and the
U.K. have indicated an intent to aggressively prosecute overseas corrup-
tion.84 In the U.K., the Financial Services Authority (FSA) has announced
its plans to investigate investment banks and private equity firms in partic-
ular, after recently releasing a report on corruption in the insurance indus-
try.85 Meanwhile, in the U.S., prosecutors have brought an increasing
number of investigations and cases against private equity firms.86 In this
new climate, private equity firms cannot fall asleep at the wheel; rather,
they must monitor quickly changing overseas anti-corruption obligations.
IV. HOW TO COMPLY
Under both the U.S. and U.K. anti-corruption regimes, firms are en-
couraged—in different ways—to adopt adequate procedures to prevent
corruption. The U.K. Bribery Law provides that such practices may consti-
tute an affirmative defense to the corporate offense.  U.S. enforcement is
more ambiguous, lacking any such statutory affirmative defense. Never-
theless, prosecutors have used the threat of FCPA prosecution to pressure
firms to adopt such procedures. The DOJ and SEC sometimes close inves-
tigations in which they are satisfied with the firm’s internal processes for
handling corruption.87 In other cases, they have entered non-prosecution
agreements with firms on the condition that those firms adopt new proce-
82. See Davidoff, supra note 1.
83. Id.
84. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Address at the American
Conference Institute’s 28th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov.
16, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-1211161.
html; FSA Gears up for Dual Attack on Bribery Act, FIN. TIMES (June 30, 2011, 10:26 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/33181c56-a34e-11e0-8d6d-00144feabdc0.html.
85. FSA Gears up for Dual Attack on Bribery Act, FIN. TIMES (June 30, 2011, 10:26
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/33181c56-a34e-11e0-8d6d-00144feabdc0.html.
86. Mara Senn et al., Recent Enforcement Trends Indicate Increased FCPA Peril for
Private Equity Firms, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contri
butions/fcpa-peril-for-private-equity-firms/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
87. See, e.g., Richard Cassin, Medtronic Wins Double Declination, FCPA BLOG (June
27, 2013, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/6/27/medtronic-wins-double-declina
tion.html (explaining how Medtronic’s internal investigations and disclosures satisfied both
the SEC and DOJ that further prosecution was not necessary).
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dures going forward.88 Many settlements provide for the appointment of
an independent monitor to ensure compliance with such a mandate.89 No-
tably, the firm must often pay the monitoring costs, which can total mil-
lions of dollars.90 The U.K. Bribery Law does not explicitly incorporate
the standard set in the American non-prosecution agreements. However,
the absence of an explicit definition of adequacy for anti-corruption proce-
dures suggests acquiescence in the current best practices in the global in-
dustry. Thus, this Note suggests that the U.K. Financial Services Authority
(FSA) and Serious Fraud Office (SFO) will likely accept the adequacy of
procedures such as those required in the U.S. non-prosecution
agreements.
In order to offer more concrete compliance guidance, the discussion
below surveys the procedures that the DOJ and SEC have required in
non-prosecution agreements. Additionally, the reader is advised to refer
to the OECD best practices in anti-corruption for more examples of sound
anti-bribery safeguards.91 While such precautions are not per se adequate
under the U.K. Bribery Law, they offer useful examples of the gold stan-
dard in commercial anti-corruption practices. Please note the flexible dis-
cretion which prosecutors on both sides of the Atlantic exercise in holding
firms operating in different contexts to different levels of procedural ac-
countability. The official Guidance accompanying the U.K. Bribery Law
indicates that the adequacy of procedures is to be judged in proportion to
the sophistication and size of the firm, as well as to the corruption risk
88. See, e.g., Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal Divison,
Dep’t of Justice, to Carlos F. Ortiz, LeClairRyan (July 6, 2012), available at http://www.jus
tice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/nordam-group/2012-07-17-nordam-npa.pdf (explaining the
procedures the DOJ will require NORDAM to comply with to avoid prosecution under the
FCPA).
89. See, e.g., id. at B-3 (“The Company will assign responsibility to one or more senior
corporate executives of the Company for the implementation and oversight of the Com-
pany’s anticorruption policies, standards, and procedures. Such corporate official(s) shall
have direct reporting obligations to independent monitoring bodies, including internal audit,
the Company’s Board of Directors, or any appropriate committee of the Board of Directors,
and shall have an adequate level of autonomy from management as well as sufficient re-
sources and authority to maintain such autonomy.”); see also Deferred Prosecution Agree-
ment at C-4, United States v. Panalpina World Transp. (Holding) Ltd. (Oct. 27, 2010), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/documents/panalpina-world-transport-dpa.pdf;  Deferred Prosecution
Agreement at C-4, United States v. Shell Nigeria Exploration & Prod. Co. Ltd. (Nov. 4,
2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/shell-dpa.pdf; Deferred Prosecution Agreement
at C-4, United States v. Transocean Inc. (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/docu
ments/transocean-dpa.pdf/; Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal
Divison, Dep’t of Justice, to Mary C. Spearing, Baker Botts LLP (July 6, 2012), at B-3, availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/noble-npa.pdf.
90. See supra, note 89; Client Alert, Willkie Farr & Gallagher, Imposition of Compli-
ance Monitors in FCPA Settlements is Down, But Recent Court Ruling Increases the Risk of
Public Access to Monitor Reports (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl_s29Publi
cations%5CFileUpload5686%5C4063%5CImposition_of_Compliance_Monitors.pdf.
91. Key OECD Anti-Corruption Documents, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/
keyoecdanti-corruptiondocuments.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
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represented by the sector or region of business.92 Thus, while one must
keep in mind the differing breadth and jurisdictional reach of the Ameri-
can and British provisions, implementing a single set of comprehensive
procedures is likely to greatly reduce liability under both pieces of
legislation.
A. Adequate Procedures:  U.S. Non-prosecution Agreements
The SEC and DOJ have entered multimillion-dollar non-prosecution
agreements with numerous companies under investigation for violations of
the FCPA. These agreements are nearly uniformly conditioned on the
adoption of specified programs to reduce the risk of future violations of
anti-corruption law. Although these procedures are not themselves incor-
porated into the statutory framework as an affirmative defense (while sim-
ilar measures, termed adequate procedures, are included in the U.K.
Bribery Law under Section 7(2)), the clear signal that these non-prosecu-
tion agreements send is that companies should adopt standardized proce-
dures to prevent, detect, and report violations of anti-corruption laws and
internal codes of ethics.93
Given the relatively greater depth of experience with such prosecu-
tions in the U.S., the terms of these agreements serve as a good indication
of the types of policies that companies should adopt to satisfy the ade-
quate procedures under the U.K. Bribery Law. The U.S. and U.K. have
effectively worked in tandem to regulate the behavior of international
businesses in the area of corruption to a far greater extent than any other
major economies.94  This collaborative effort has helped to establish an
international standard for ethical conduct. In fact, there is a growing
sense95 that the increased anti-corruption enforcement efforts in the U.S.
92. BRIBERY ACT 2010 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 21 (“Adequate bribery prevention
procedures ought to be proportionate to the bribery risks that the organisation faces. An
initial assessment of risk across the organisation is therefore a necessary first step. To a cer-
tain extent the level of risk will be linked to the size of the organisation and the nature and
complexity of its business, but size will not be the only determining factor.”).
93. BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 33, § 7(2).
94. SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY, available at http://www.sfo.
gov.uk/media/57517/international%20strategy.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (discussing the
U.K. SFO’s coordination with American, European, and other foreign anti-corruption and
anti-fraud authorities); see also Mythili Raman, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Key-
note Address at Global Anti-Corruption Congress (Jun. 17, 2013), available at http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2013/crm-speech-130617.html (“[L]ong before the U.K.
Bribery Act was even proposed, we were working together with the U.K.’s Serious Fraud
Office to bring cases against U.S. and U.K. companies alike, as well as their executives and
agents involved in bribery schemes.”).
95. Phil Beckett, A Preventative Approach, GLOBAL LEGAL POST (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.globallegalpost.com/blogs/global-view/a-preventative-approach-61611724/ (“To
avoid the attentions of the SFO altogether, organisations must ensure that they have ade-
quate procedures in place.  Until now, these have primarily been seen as a defence mecha-
nism and best-practice for bribery avoidance. All firms clearly need to implement a mixture
of good policies, procedures and training[.]”)
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and U.K. are designed to promote this standard more broadly as quasi-
compulsory, rather than simply exemplary practice. For this reason, some
insights based on the particular compliance conditions imposed in many of
the larger FCPA non-prosecution agreements can be instructive. It is im-
portant to note that the U.K. Bribery Law is, in some ways, more demand-
ing than the FCPA and that compliance with one will not necessarily
suffice to avoid prosecution under the other. A more detailed discussion
of the differences between the two standards is addressed in Part IV.B.
The DOJ non-prosecution agreements typically list conditions that the
company under investigation must satisfy if it is to avoid prosecution.
Some commentators have criticized the ubiquity of these agreements,
since they foist stringent requirements and hefty fines upon companies
without having to prove the facts of a case or the application of underlying
legal theories in court.96 Others, however, have argued that companies
enter these agreements to ensure greater predictability, and that they have
had a positive impact by encouraging firms to abide by more uniform ethi-
cal standards. The particular terms vary somewhat from agreement to
agreement, depending on the type, scale, and severity of the corruption
activities under investigation. However, the basic requirements (generally
spelled out in Appendix B of the agreements) are largely uniform.97
Consider, for example, RAE’s $1.7 million settlement agreement with
the DOJ in 2010.98 The twelve conditions listed in Appendix B of the
Agreement required:
(1) the inclusion in its corporate code of a statement against violations of the
FCPA, other corruption laws, and its internal ethics requirements;
(2) senior management to demonstrate strong, visible, and explicit support
and commitment to compliance with the FCPA and other anti-corruption
laws and standards;
(3) the adoption of internal policies to discourage violations of the FCPA
and other anti-corruption laws and standards by its employees, directors,
and, where appropriate, third parties (each of whom is to be notified of
their duty to help ensure compliance throughout the company). Specifi-
cally, the company is to adopt policies addressing:
(i) gifts;
(ii) hospitality, entertainment, and expenses;
(iii) customer travel;
(iv) political contributions;
(v) charitable donations and sponsorships;
(vi) facilitation payments; and
96. See Mike Koehler, The Fac¸ade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L.
907 (2010).
97. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecution Agree-
ments, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF L., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/
home.suphp (last updated Jan. 29, 2014); SEC Enforcement Actions, supra note 32.
98. Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal Divison, Dep’t of
Justice, and Melinda L. Haag, U.S. Att’y, N.D. Ca., to Carlos F. Ortiz, LeClairRyan, and Roy
K. McDonald, DLA Piper (Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/cases/rae-systems/12-10-10rae-systems.pdf.
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(vii) solicitation and extortion; and
(4) the tailoring of these policies to a comprehensive assessment of risk fac-
tors specific to the company based on the prevalence of joint ventures,
the volume of dealings with immigration or customs, frequency and
scope of interactions with foreign government officials, and the extent of
business carried out in high-risk countries or sectors;
(5) the institution of an annual review and overhaul of internal policies
where improvement is needed to reduce corruption risk;
(6) the appointment of at least one senior corporate executive officer to
oversee implementation of anti-corruption efforts, possessing reporting
duties to independent monitoring bodies, internal audit, the Board of
Directors, and any relevant subcommittee thereof. The designated offi-
cial shall have sufficient autonomy from the Board of Directors, and ade-
quate resources and authority to maintain that autonomy;
(7) the adoption of policies to ensure fair and accurate accounting and book-
keeping;
(8) the implementation of effective mechanisms to ensure compliance stan-
dards are communicated to all employees, directors, and relevant third
parties, including but not limited to the adoption of mandatory anti-cor-
ruption training and annual certification;
(9) the establishment of effective resources to offer guidance, including in
emergency situations in all countries where the company carries on busi-
ness, on anti-corruption compliance for all employees, directors and ap-
propriate third parties. The company shall establish a means to
encourage the confidential reporting of violations within the company.
Additionally, it shall provide mechanisms and procedures to protect re-
porters and those who refuse to engage in prohibited conduct. Further,
the company shall take reasonable steps to address reported violations;
(10) the adoption of disciplinary procedures to address violations within the
company;
(11) the exercise and proper documentation of due diligence in the retention
and oversight of third parties, the communication to agents and business
partners of the company’s commitment to compliance with anti-corrup-
tion laws and standards, and requesting such third parties undertake a
reciprocal commitment; and
(12) the inclusion, where appropriate, of anti-corruption terms in its contracts
with third parties, such as providing for a right to audit the partner’s
internal records, and granting the company the right to terminate the
contract if the partner engages in behavior violating the FCPA, other
corruption laws, or internal standards.
This set of requirements is largely mirrored in the other FCPA non-
prosecution agreements. For example, the list is identical in the Tenaris,
Deutsche Telekom, and Comverse agreements.99 This pattern indicates
the emergence of a coherent and consistent set of anti-bribery standards.
Very likely, these can be used as adequate procedures under Section 7 of
the U.K. Bribery Law corporate offense. Since the onus is on the business
to prove that its efforts to prevent corruption have been in good faith,
many turn to the slew of independent specialists that comprise a budding
99. For a complete listing of agreements, see Garrett & Ashley, supra note 97.
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industry of corruption compliance consultants.100 By contracting with
outside specialists, businesses subject their practices to external review,
which has, at the very least, the appearance of greater impartiality. These
specialists may, for example, be involved in regular staff training sessions
to help disseminate knowledge about which practices are prohibited, how
an employee can report suspected violations, or how to seek out confiden-
tial practical guidance within the firm.101 Through anonymous reporting,
detection of accounting discrepancies, or other means, they may also help
identify those segments of the business in which corruption continues to
pose a risk requiring further mitigation efforts.102
B. Differences between U.K. and U.S. Compliance
The three most significant differences between the U.S. and U.K. legis-
lations deal with (1) bribery of those other than public officials, (2) the
treatment of facilitation payments, and (3) the defense of legality under
local law. Under the FCPA, neither facilitation payments nor payments to
purely private commercial parties is prohibited (though, again, recent ef-
forts to apply the Travel Act to private commercial bribery may mean this
is changing). Meanwhile, the U.K. Bribery Law takes a more far-reaching
approach, prohibiting both such payments.103 This serves to substantially
broaden the scope of activities falling within the new U.K. anti-corruption
provisions. As a consequence, compliance with the U.K. Bribery Law will
usually require more rigorous oversight than will compliance with the
FCPA. Private equity firms must be wary not only of bribes being paid on
their behalf to foreign government officials, but also those improper pay-
ments being made in the private sphere. All dealings with potential clients
or other business partners must be carefully monitored to ensure that no
improper payments are made for unfair advantage.
Additionally, so-called facilitation payments, which are subject to a
special carve-out in the FCPA, are prohibited under the U.K. Bribery
Law.104 A facilitation payment is the payment of a standard fee to facili-
tate or expedite a transaction. Where one draws the line between these
payments and bribery, however, is rather murky. To this end, the British
law may not necessarily represent a harsher application of anti-corruption
100. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, THE UK BRIBERY ACT (2011), available at  http://www.
ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/UK_Bribery_Act_-_Developing_an_anti-corruption_comp
liance_framework/$FILE/EY_UK_Bribery_Act_-_Developing_anticorruption_compliance_
framework.pdf; Anti-Bribery Training, TRANSPARENCY INT’L UK, http://www.transparency.
org.uk/our-work/bribery-act/training (last visited Mar. 3, 2014); About TRACE, TRACE
INT’L, http://www.traceinternational.org/Trace/about-trace.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
101. See, e.g., Anti-Corruption & FCPA Services, SIERRA FIN. GRP., http://www.sfg-
global.com/fcpa-consulting (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (describing training services offered).
102. Id. (describing risk-analysis services).
103. Facilitation Payments, supra note 42.
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) (2012); Facilitation Payments, supra
note 42.
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law to such payments. Rather, its goal may simply be to grant prosecutors
greater leverage in settlement negotiations and the ability to avoid arguing
over what is, or is not, a facilitation payment rather than a bribe.
Finally, the FCPA provides that payments that would otherwise be
deemed corrupt, and therefore prohibited, are permissible when made in
compliance with local law.105 Notably, such a general defense is absent in
the U.K. Bribery Law; the local law carve-out applies only to the bribery
of foreign public officials.106 Thus, while making a particular type of pay-
ment may be allowed under the FCPA by virtue of being consistent with
local law, it may still violate the U.K. Bribery Law.
V. CONCLUSION AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER GROWTH
The U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 brings significant new zeal to the global
effort to combat corruption. It not only joins the U.S. in enacting stringent
measures under which to prosecute the bribery of foreign government offi-
cials, but it also extends the scope of overseas bribery law to reach im-
proper payments made in the private commercial sphere. This move does
more than simply indicate support for good governance overseas; it could
also facilitate the creation of more transparent and efficient markets
around the world. If effective, this attack on corruption will not only aid
development in emerging markets, but will also help business planning
and cost projections.  Exactly how far the British Act’s jurisdiction will
reach remains ambiguous.  It should be clear, however, that businesses op-
erating globally, particularly those acquiring new targets, must be mindful
to prevent corruption globally. The techniques and standards developed
under the FCPA offer the most detailed guidance for how businesses can
proceed. In particular, the measures required in FCPA non-prosecution
agreements provide a relatively specific list of good practices.
With increasing investment overseas at the precise moment that the
U.S. and U.K. are stepping up their anti-bribery enforcement efforts, pri-
vate equity firms must be on guard to adequately assess corruption risks
and be proactive in formulating new industry-wide and firm-specific plans
to mitigate those risks. This Note proposes that there will likely be further
convergence between the British and American anti-corruption regimes,
and that standards developed in the context of FCPA non-prosecution
agreements are a good starting point with regard to adequate procedures
under the U.K. Bribery Law. As other nations, such as Russia, enter the
field, compliance may become somewhat more complicated.
Conversely, as more nations enact such regimes, businesses will press
harder for uniformity, at least among the more developed economies, to
level the playing field. American or British companies losing business to
bribe-paying French or Italian companies are likely to pressure their gov-
ernments to further multilateralize anti-corruption law. While a more ro-
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1).
106. BRIBERY ACT 2010, supra note 33, § 5(2).
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bust OECD or UN treaty may prove impractical, there could be a
significant convergence of pressures to force the EU, Canada, or Australia
to act.
Interest groups as diverse as development activists and big business
have reason to harmonize and extend global anti-corruption regimes. For
activists, corruption is an ethical scourge and a practical obstacle to devel-
opment and good governance. At the same time, global businesses ex-
posed to U.S. and U.K. anti-corruption regimes surely bristle each time a
potentially corrupt rival bidder, free from such liability, wins a government
contract or gains another advantage. Ultimately, a more rigorous global
regime to combat corruption would be a boon to development and good
governance around the world, while also enhancing business and market
efficiency. What started four decades ago as an idealistic American project
to end bribery may now have substantial global business interests support-
ing its continued expansion. The field is changing, growing, and
diversifying.107
In the short-term, the challenge laid down before the U.S. is whether it
will follow the British lead in regulating private commercial bribery along-
side the bribery of foreign public officials. The FCPA alone does not pro-
vide a framework for such prosecutions. However, a recent case shows
how the Travel Act may fill the gaps and lay the groundwork for future
prosecutions to reach non-governmental overseas bribery. The DOJ, in
Nexus Technologies (E.D. Pa. 2010),108 invoked the Travel Act in tandem
with the FCPA to prosecute individuals for the bribery of persons in Viet-
nam for commercial advantage. A dispute existed as to whether the al-
leged bribery was covered by the FCPA, because the recipients may not
have fallen under the “foreign public officials” definition. The DOJ side-
stepped the issue by arguing that the bribes had also run afoul of the
Travel Act, a 1952 federal statute criminalizing interstate travel or trans-
107. Further areas of controversy remain regarding, for example, the treatment of for-
eign investment contracts in which a bribe was paid to secure the contract. In World Duty
Free Co. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (Oct. 4, 2006), an ICSID
tribunal found that a foreign investor who had bribed a Kenyan government official lost the
right to bring his expropriation claim under a Bilateral Investment Treaty by virtue of having
paid a bribe contrary to l’orde public. This creates the odd outcome that a state can shield
itself from potential liability by seeking bribes. An investor, on the other hand, must be
careful not to pay any bribes in the course of securing or operating its investment, in order to
preserve claims under Bilateral Investment Treaties. Id. In addition to the interaction with
international arbitration law, as described in World Duty Free above, corruption could grow
in the future as businesses become more used to complying, and more aware that some of
their rivals are obtaining unfair benefits by not complying. Under a competition theory, rival
businesses could be granted a private cause of action analogous to those in antitrust, so that a
non-bribing business that loses a contract or other benefit could recover damages from a
bribing business that does secure the benefit. This would take corruption law partially out of
the realm of purely public law. However, it would serve to promote equality between simi-
larly situated parties and would enable far more vigorous enforcement.
108. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Nexus Technologies Inc. and Three Employees
Plead Guilty to Paying Bribes to Vietnamese Officials (Mar. 16, 2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-270.html.
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portation in furtherance of an unlawful act.109 Essentially, this Act feder-
alized the bribery laws of any state. Such domestic bribery laws generally
reach commercial bribery, that is, bribery where the recipient is a private
party, as well as the bribery of public officials.110 The DOJ argued that the
Travel Act covered bribery of individuals located outside the U.S., in ef-
fect establishing a U.S. equivalent to the U.K. Bribery Law’s regulation of
purely private commercial bribery around the world. However, the DOJ’s
theory remains untested for now, as the parties in Nexus Technologies
pleaded guilty. Nevertheless, U.S. prosecution strategies and possible
changes in the law could lead to the U.S. joining the U.K. in regulating the
bribery of private, as well as of public individuals, around the world.
Just as the U.K. may be drawing on U.S. standards, the U.S. seems to
also be following U.K. developments in the field. Parties technically sub-
ject only to U.S., but not U.K., jurisdiction may, in effect, find themselves
required to comply with the broader range of standards being developed
in the U.K. Bribery law. The field of anti-corruption enforcement can be
expected to continue to grow and converge globally as international guide-
lines are incorporated into domestic laws, as the domestic laws of one
country adopt standards developed in other countries, as domestic laws
incorporate soft law, and as the industry develops better methods for
preventing bribery.
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012).
110. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 641.3 (2013); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180 (2013); DEL.
CODE  tit. 11, § 881 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 271, § 39 (2013).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\3-1\MPE103.txt unknown Seq: 22 14-APR-14 9:36
96 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 3:75
